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Abstract:  The  following  paper  deals  with  the  local  public  finance  system  in  some 
Scandinavian countries; namely Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Besides illustrating the 
local taxes, the main focus of this paper is the equalisation between the local authorities. 
Although all three countries are unitary countries, the grants and transfers are mostly 
arranged in a Robin-Hood-like scheme. Moreover, in the last few decades a number of 
reforms  at  the  level  of  the  social  security  systems  took  place  in  the  three  Nordic 
countries, but today the Scandinavians provide their citizens still with a high level of 
welfare.       
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1. Introduction 
After  the  break-up  of  the  “United Kingdom of Denmark, Norway
2 and Sweden”
3 in 
1521, the Swedish kingdom was formed and became a constitutional monarchy in 1866, 
while  Denmark  received  this  status  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  already  in  1846. 
Norway held a referendum about the decision between a republic and monarchy and the 
voters opted for the constitutional monarchy in 1905. Today in all three countries the 
king has mainly representative functions and the important political issues are solved in 
the national parliament. But the common historical roots of the Scandinavian countries 
explain a lot of similarities in the economic and political institutions. 
All  three  counties  are  unitary  counties  with  three  tiers  of  government.  Besides  the 
central government, the Nordic countries are divided in counties
4 and municipalities, 
which are extremely compact in an international comparison.
5 The following table 1 
shows the some important information about the structure of the three countries: 
Table 1:  Indicators of the structure in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2003  
Denmark  Norway  Sweden 
Number of inhabitants  5,383,507  4,525,000  8,940,788




Name of the counties  amtskommuner  fylker  landsting 
Number of municipalities / Capital  275 / Copenhagen 434 / Oslo  290 / Stockholm
Median inhabitants of a county   287,866  218,171  273,563 
Median inhabitants of a municipality   10,461  4,439  15,209 
GDP per capita  € 26,150  € 31,595  € 22,460 
GDP per capita in relation to the average 
amount of the European Community   
123 %  148%  115% 
   Source: own calculations   
2. Revenue Structure of the Scandinavian Municipalities and Counties 
The most important sources of the local Scandinavian authorities are taxes – mainly 
local surcharges on the personal income tax (PIT) –, while vertical grants do not play 
such an important role as in other unitary and federal countries. The following table 2 
points out the revenue structure of counties and municipalities in the three respective 
countries:  3







   € 57.17 billion  € 24.75 billion  € 63.25 billion 
Taxes  59 %  48.1 %  66 % 
Fees and user charges   19 %  15.2 %  8 % 
Grants  22 %  35.2 %  22 % 
Other   0 %  1.5 %  4 % 
Total local revenues per capita    € 10,591   € 5,470  € 7,074 
        Source: own calculation 
But the taxation power and the local autonomy differ more between the three countries 
than it seems at a first glance.  
The Danish PIT (Indkomst Skat) is composed by a federal tariff system fixed by the 
central government and a flat tax rate by the counties and municipalities. In the fiscal 
year of 2001 the central government raised three tax tariffs 
•  The basic rate (bundskat) of 6.25%
9 up to an annual taxable income of  € 23,938 
•  The middle rate (mellemskat) of 6 % for the amount between € 23,939 and € 37,260 
•  And the top rate (topskat) of 15 % for every amount above € 37,260  
Additionally the counties and the municipalities can levy a local surcharge on the PIT. 
The local authorities are independent to fix their local flat rate and the only restriction in 
Denmark  is  that  the  total  individual  tax  rate  does  not  pass  the  limit  of  59  %.  The 
following figure 1 describes the development of the local surcharges on the PIT since 
1970:      
Figure 1: Development of the average, local (municipalities & counties) surcharge in % on the PIT 




























 Source: own calculation based on various publications of the Danish Skatteministeriet 4
While the average local tax rate on the PIT increased from 15.7 % in 1970 to 32.6 % in 
2002, the federal tax rates have declined enormously in Denmark. For example in 1994 
the bundskat amounted to 14.5 % and in 2002 the same rate totalled only 5.5%.  
Besides  the  surcharges  to  the  PIT  the  municipalities  can  levy  some  property  taxes, 
which  are  called  Grundskyld,  Daekningsafgigt  and  Frigorelseafgift.  The  value  of  a 
property  is  based  on  the  market  value  (see  Josten,  2000)  and  is  classified  into 
categories:  
1.  the total value of a property including all buildings, which are located on the 
property  
2.  the ground value of the property, which is calculated by the market value of the 
undeveloped real estate 
3.  and structure value of the property, which is calculated by the total value minus 
the ground value
The Grundskyld uses the ground value as a tax base and the municipalities are allowed 
to fix a tax rate of between of 0.6 % and 2.4%. The counties can levy only a uniform tax 
rate of 1 %. The Grundskyld taxes only private property, while commercial and public 
properties are exempted.     
The Daekningsafgig uses the structure value of commercial property as a tax base and 
only the municpalities can fix a uniform tax rate of 1%. Public property is taxed
10 also 
by the Daekningsafgig with a municipal, uniform rate of 0,4 % and a county tax rate of 
0.5%.   
The  Frigorelseafgift tries  to  capitalize  the  increase  of  a  property  value  within  the 
framework of changes in the local development plan, which means that rural land can 
be used as building land or brwonfield. The Frigorelseafgift is based on the total value, 
but the revenues are very small and are divided envenly between the central government 
and the municipalities.  
Moreover, the personal income also regards also the benefit of self-owned property. 
These tax revenues, which are based on the total value, are distributed equally between 
the  central  government,  the  counties  and  the  municipalities.  The  following  figure  2 
shows how the tax revenues from real property developed from 1988 until 1997:        5









1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Grundskyld cities Grundskyld counties
Daekningsafgigt cities Daekningsafgigt counties
total
Source: own illustration based on data from Josten, 2000, page 111 
A very small tax export exists at the Danish property tax, namely in holiday homes. In 
some of the costal village the portion of summer cottages makes up more than 25 per 
cent  of  the  local  housing  stock.  Blom-Hansen  observed  for  40  of  these  costal 
municipalities that the average tax rate of the Grundskyld among the 40 municipalities 
is almost 50 per cent
11 higher than the national average in 2000 (see Blom-Hansen, 
2002, page 7).   
Furthermore, tax sharing between the central government and the local authorities for 
the corporate income tax exits in Denmark, but these revenues amount to only 2 % of  
the complete local tax revenues.  
The local taxation in Norway is based on the personal income tax, the wealth tax, the 
property tax and the natural resource tax. The following table 3 shows the distribution 
of the tax revenues between counties and municipalities in 2003:  
Table 3: Local tax revenues in Norway in 2003  
Municipalities  Counties 
  € billion  in %  € billion  in % 
PIT  8.64  88.3  2.03  98.8 
Wealth tax  0.6  6.2  -  - 
Property tax  0.4  4.0  -  - 
Natural resource tax  0.15  1.5  0.02  1.2 
total  9.78  100  2.05  100 
Total local tax revenues per capita  € 2,161  --  € 453  -- 
         Source: Borge, 2004, page 3  6
Similar  to  Denmark,  the  PIT  is  the  most  important  tax  for  the  local  authorities  in 
Norway. But in some rural townships with waterfalls the natural resource tax plays a 
huge role
12, because this kind of electricity tax is based on the quantity of produced 
electricity in the power stations.   
The municipalities and counties can fix their local surcharge on the PIT independently, 
but  otherwise  the  central  government  limits  the  highest  tax  rate.  Since  1977  all 
municipalities  in  Norway  have  chosen  the  highest  possible  tax  rate  of  the  PIT  (see 
Borge and Ratto, 1997) and therefore the Norwegian system cannot characterised as a 
very  decentralised  country  like  Denmark.  Rather,  municipalities  and  counties  are 
dependent on the tax setting by the central government in Oslo. In fact, the Norwegian 
local  public  system  can  be  compared  with  the  tax  sharing  of  the  PIT  in  Austria, 
Germany and Poland than with Denmark or Sweden.   
The  same  situation  like  the  PIT  exists  with  the  wealth  tax;  the  municipalities  are 
allowed to levy a flat tax rate, which is limited to 0.7 % by the central government, and 
the central government uses various rates to generate a progressive tax situation. The 
counties are excluded from the revenues of the wealth taxes.  
The property tax is an optional tax for private and commercial property and is currently 
levied in more than 220 of 434 municipalities, while the counties are excluded again 
from these taxes. Therefore, fees and user charges are the only own resource of the local 
authorities in Norway, which are fixed completely independently at the local level and 
“since  1980  user  charges  have  been  the  fastest  growing  revenue  component  of 
Norwegian local and county governments” (see Borge, 2000, page 703.)
13
Both the Swedish counties and the Swedish municipalities can levy a flat tax rate on the 
personal income tax. Until the 1991 PIT reform, which generates a “dual income tax”
14, 
Sweden had extremely high tax rates for the PIT; at 73 % it was the highest rates of all 
OECD-countries. Since 1991 the central government has received all capital revenues, 
while the counties and municipalities can levy a surcharge
15 on the “labour part” of the 
PIT  (Kommunal  Inkomstskatt)  and  the  central  government  fixes  the  different 
progressive tax rates. The following figure 3 describes the development of the local 
surcharges on the PIT in Sweden since 1974:    7
Figure 3: Development of the average, local (county, parish and municipality) surcharge in % on 



























county+parish+municiapl rate municipal rate
Source: own illustration based data on Statistka centralbyran 
The average, municipal
16 rate increased from 14.85 % in 1974 to 20.79 % in 2004. 
Besides this general increase in the average municipal rate during the last thirty years, 
the development from 1991 to 1992 have to born in mind. The increase from 17.32 % in 
1991 to 19.38 % in 1992 can be explained by the fact that the responsibility for the care 
of elderly citizens has shifted from the counties towards the municipalities.  
Moreover, Sweden changed their constitution in 2000 and since this time the parishes 
have not received their surcharge on the PIT any more, which illustrates the lowering of 
the total – county, parish and municipalities - local surcharges from 1999 to 2000 in 
figure 3. In 1974 the lowest parish surcharges of 0.62 % were levied in the county of 
Göteburg,  while  the  highest  parish  surcharge  was  fixed  at  1.05  %  in  the  county  of 
Uppsala. The gap between lowest and highest parish surcharge has grown over the time 
and in 1999 the citizen of Göteburg paid a parish rate of 0.85 % and in the county of 
Gotland the local parish rate amounted to 1.77%. 
In  the  fiscal  year  of  2000  the  central  government  abolished  the  upper  limit  of  the 
municipal  rate,  but  the  differences  in  the  tax  rate  are  not  very  huge.  Compared  to 
Switzerland, where municipalities and cantons use the surcharges on the PIT to attract 
wealthy inhabitants to their respective authority, in Sweden exists no strong local tax 
competition between the counties and municipalities. In 2004 the inhabitants of the city 
of Dals-Ed had to pay the highest, total local surcharge at rate of 34.04 %, while the 
lowest total local surcharges on the PIT were levied in the city of Kävling with 28.90 %. 
The lowest municipal rate amounted to 17.58 % in the city of Solna, while the highest 8
municipal rate of 23.79 %
17 was found in city of Dals-Ed. One reason for the small 
difference in the tax-settings is the local equalisation system in Sweden, which will be 
explained in detail in the next chapter.  
3. Equalisation systems of the Scandinavian Municipalities and Counties
In  Denmark  the  local  government  grants  and  equalisation  system  consists  of  four 
elements:  
•  Equalisation of the expenditure needs between the municipalities  
•  Equalisation of the tax base between the municipalities 
•  General grants from the central government  
•  Various special grants from the central government 
The equalisation of the expenditure needs is based on the age of the municipal citizens 
as well as on some social factors like for example children with a single parent, the 
number of unemployed  people or welfare recipients.  
The following table 4 summarize the different emphasis of the “age factor” and the 
“social factor” in equalisation needs formula in the different local authorities.     
Table 4: Emphasis of the “age factor“and the “social factor“ in Denmark in the fiscal year of 2002 
age factor  social factor 
(rural) municipalities  80 %  20 % 
municipalities around Copenhagen   75 %  25% 
counties  77.5 %  22.5% 
                         Source: Danish Ministry of the Interior and Health, 2002, page 45 
The  age  factor  calculates  a  special  amount  for  every  county  and  municipality  in 
Denmark, which represents the exact age of every citizen. The highest amounts per 
capita are assigned for pupils (age class 7-16) and elder people (age class 85 years and 
older).  Moreover,  the  metropolitan  municipalities  around  the  capital  of  Copenhagen 
received per capita higher amounts. Table 5 abstracts the different age amounts in the 
fiscal year of 2002:     
Table 5: Classification of the different age amounts in Denmark in 2002 
(rural) municipalities  municipalities around Copenhagen
0 to 6-year-olds  € 5,704  € 6,349 
7 to 16-year-olds,   € 7,740  € 8,376 
17 to 19-year-olds  € 1,140  € 1,125 
20 to 24-year-olds  € 1,374  € 1,353 9
25-34-year-olds  € 1,481  € 1,460 
35-39-year-olds  € 1,477  € 1,456 
40-64-year-olds  €  1,176  € 1,164 
65-74-year-olds  € 2,416  € 2,416 
75-84-year-olds  € 5,531  € 5,448 
85+-year-olds  € 13,354  € 12, 433 
           Source: own calculation   
The  social  factor  does  not  use  actual  expenditure,  rather  it  uses  unique,  fictitious 
expenditure, and the different weights of the social criteria cost is shown in table 6:  






# of children of single parents  32.5 %  32.5 %  48 % 
# of inhabitants    25 %  --  - 
# of rented dwellings  --  20 %  -- 
# of 20-59-year-olds without job   25 %  25 %  -- 
# of foreign people    10 %  10 %  -- 
#  of  25-49-year-olds  without 
vocational training 
--  12.5 %  -- 
# of welfare recipient   7.5%  --  -- 
#  of  single  inhabitants  over  65 
years 
--  --  48.0% 
Roads and public areas    --  --  4.0% 
     Source: Danish Ministry of the Interior and Health, 2002, page 45  
The local equalisation of the tax base rests, not on tax revenues or on fees and charges, 
but  on  the  tax  base  of  the  PIT  and  of  all  the  property  taxes.  The  tax  base  of  a 
municipality or a county is calculated per inhabitant and is compared with the average 
national  amount  per  inhabitant.  If  a  local  authority  has  a  higher  tax  base  than  the 
average national tax base, it has to pay some grants to the local authorities with a lower 
tax  base.  This  horizontal  equalisation  system  is  similar  to  the  German  equalisation 
system among the states (see Spahn, Werner, 2004), but the German system equalises 
tax revenues while the Danish system equalises tax bases.    
As in the calculation of the expenditure needs, the municipalities around Copenhagen 
receive a “bonus”, because their tax base is not compared to the national tax base but 
rather to the average tax base of all municipalities surrounding Copenhagen.
18  
Generally speaking, every “recipient municipality” gets 45 % of the difference between 
their  own  municipal  tax  base  and  the  national  average  tax  base  from  the  “donor 10
municipalities”. Additionally, all municipalities with a tax base lower than 90% of the 
national average receive horizontal transfers, filling 40 % of the gap to the national 
average.  
Besides the equalisation of expenditure needs and the equalisation of the tax base, some 
vertical grants from the central government to the counties and the municipalities also 
exist.    
The  central  government  funds  economically  weak  local  authorities  with  general 
transfers. Therefore the municipalities obtained € 35.64 million and the counties € 7.84 
million from the central government in 2002.    
Special grants were disbursed by the central government to local authorities on major 
islands to balance additional expenditure like ferry transportation costs or to subsidise 
young people who have to leave the island to get an education. The “island-grant” has 
amounted to € 5 million in 2002.  Moreover, the central government pays a special 
transfer to the local authorities due to housing costs of asylum seekers.    
Additionally, all Danish municipalities and counties get block grants from the central 
government and the annual amount is fixed by the central government independently for 
every fiscal year. These block grants amounted to € 3.3 billion for the municipalities 
and to € 1.1 billion for the counties in the fiscal year of 2002.   
The following figures 4 illustrates the Danish municipalities before the equalisation and 
figure 5 shows the municipalities after equalisation measured by expenditure need and 
tax base in the fiscal year of 2002:  
Figure 4: The Danish municipalities before the equalisation in 2002 
Source: Danish Ministry of the Interior and Health, 2002, page 42 











































Tax base per inhabitant 11
Figure 5: The Danish municipalities after the equalisation in 2002  
Source: Danish Ministry of the Interior and Health, 2002, page 42 
The Danish equalisation system balances the different tax bases and expenditure needs 
very  carefully,  which  can  be  observed  closely  in  the  concentration  of  Danish 
municipalities on both national averages in figure 5.  
Compared to Denmark, the Norwegian equalisation system is not so all-embracing. In 
Norway no general equalisation of the different expenditure needs exists and the tax 
equalisation is not based on the tax base but rather on the tax revenues.   
The  Norwegian  tax  equalisation  is  generated  as  follows.  The  tax  revenues  of  every 
municipality and every county are calculated per inhabitant and are compared with the 
average national amount per inhabitant. For the municipalities, the tax revenues include 
for the municipalities the personal income tax, the wealth tax and the natural resource 
tax, while the counties have to include only the PIT and the natural resource tax. The 
property tax, which can be levied optionally by the municipalities, is not integrated in 
the tax equalisation system.  
If  a  municipality  (county)  has  tax  revenues  below  110  %  (120  %)  of  the  average 
national tax revenues, they received grants by the central government, which close 90 % 
of their fiscal gap towards the 110 % (120 %). If a local authority possesses more than 
134  %  of  the  national  average  tax  revenues,  they  have  to  share  50  %  of  every  tax 
revenues above the limit with the central government.  
390  municipalities  received  the  tax  equalisation  (block)  grant  from  the  central 
government, 28 municipalities were located in the “neutral zone” between 110 % and 
134 % and only 16 municipalities had to share a part of their revenues with the central 












































their high tax revenues with the central government, while the 18 counties received the 
block grants from the central government due to tax equalisation (see Borge 2004). 
Since  1917,  an  equalisation  grant  system  has  existed  in  Sweden.  Before  1993  the 
Swedish municipalities were classified into 12 different groups depending on various 
criteria like population or climate zone. The new equalisation system of 1993 – with 
some small supplements in 1996 and 2005 – abolished a bulk of vertical special grants 
and focused mainly on a horizontal equalisation system which is quite similar to the 
Danish conception. Therefore, the Swedish local equalisation system also consists of the 
following four elements:  
•  Equalisation of expenditure needs between the municipalities  
•  Equalisation of tax base between the municipalities
•  General grants from the central government  
•  Various special grants from the central government 
The equalisation of the expenditure needs between the municipalities does not use two 
major factors - “the age factor” and the “social factor” – like Denmark. In contrast to the 
different  emphasis  of  the  two  Danish  factors,  the  Swedish  equalisation  of  the 
expenditure  needs  uses  nine  different  factors,  all  of  which  possess  all  the  same 
emphasis.  The  following  table  7  explains  the  effect  of  these  nine  factors  on  six
19
Swedish municipalities in 2005: 
Table 7: Effect of the equalisation of the expenditure need on six Swedish cities in € in 2005 
Average  Stockholm  Göteburg  Bjurholm  Burlöv  Dorotea  Umeå 
Pre school  468  562  500  314  542  263  455 
Comprehensive
School 




337  237  280  422  356  433  330 
Welfare  308  500  506  106  357  207  300 
Foreign people  9  22  26  0  35  0  0 
Elderly people  851  901  814  1,489  682  1,690  540 
Migration  5  0  0  89  0  141  0 
Settlement  
structure 
19  101  12  189  -10  208  30 
Public 
transportation 
52  85  102  51  49  27  51 13
total  2,970  3,108  2,993  3,706  2,957  4,067  2596 
Receiving 
Grants  (+)  or 
donor grants (-)
0  +138  +23  736  -13  +1097  -374 
Source: own calculation based on Statistka centralbyran 
As in Denmark, the Sewdish equalisation of tax revenues is based on the tax base and 
uses the following equation for the calculation: 
(1) TTi =  0.95 * POPi * tnation ( TBi – TBnation) 
TTi : tax base transfer of municipality  
TBi : tax base of municipality i of the the PIT per capita   
POPi : Number of inhabitants in municipality 
TBnation : average nationwide tax base of the PIT per capita  
tnation : average nationwide tax rate of the PIT 
Consequently, a donor municipality has a positive TTi  while a receiving municipality 
has a negative TTi . Nevertheless the whole tax base equalisation system is completely 
self-financing, because the grants to poorer municipalities are financed completly by the 
richer  municipalities  without  any  funds  from  the  central  government.  Compared  to 
Denmark where the ”equalisation factor” amounts to only 0.45 in general – without  the 
extra amount for municipalities with a tax base lower than 90% – the Swedish tax base 
equalisation factor amounts to 0.95 
Moreover,  the  incentive  effects  of  the  Swedish  tax  equalization  scheme  can  be 
summarized
20 in the following three equations, where the net tax revenues (NTRi) are 
determined by the subtraction of the gross tax revenues (GTRi ) with a tax base transfer 
of the municipality (TTi )   
(2) NTRi =GTRi -TTi = POPi * ti  yi  - 0.95 * POPi * tnation ( TBi – TBnation) 
(3) NTRi =  POPi * TBi  (ti – 0.95 tnation) + 0.95 * POPi * tnation * TBnation 
(4)  
(NTR )
* *(1 ) 0.95 * *[(1 ) ]
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + − − +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
i i i i i nation nation i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
t POP t TB t TB t POP t TB
POP TB POP TBI
t POP t TB t t TB POP t TB t
= effect of a change in the tax rate                    = effect of a change in the tax rate on the 
   on the local revenues                                          payments in the equalisation system                
As a matter of course, such a high “equalisation factor” of 0.95 reduces the incentives 
for the local authorities to start a tax competition. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 14
Swedish municipalities fix their local surcharges on the PIT very near closely to the 
average  national  surcharge  and  do  not  have  such  a  wide  gap  between  the  local 
surcharges as in Switzerland. 
The  following  figures  6  illustrates  the  Swedish  municipalities  before  the  horizontal 
equalisation  and  figure  7  shows  the  municipalities  after  equalisation  measured  by 
expenditure need
21 and tax base in the fiscal year of 2005: 
Figure 6 The Swedish municipalities before the equalisation in 2005 (calculated in €; preliminary 




















Source: own calculation  
Figure 7 The Swedish municipalities after the equalisation in 2005 (calculated in €; preliminary 




















Source: own calculation 15
Figure 7 shows a gap at the expenditure level, while the tax bases is already equalised 
nearly to the national average. This wide variation of the expenditure needs compared to 
the tax base in figure 7 can be explained by two facts. First the vertical grants from the 
central  government  are  not  mentioned  in  this  calculation  and  second  the  tax  base 
equalisation will be mentioned also in the calculation of the cost base in the long run. 
Both  effects  will  be  presented  in  a  separate  figure  8  later.  But  before  that,  a  short 
description of the different vertical grants in Sweden is more appropriate.  
The central government distributes to every municipality a block grant, which amounts 
to € 218 million in total or € 24 per capita in 2005. The counties are also received a 
block grant from the central government of  € 155 million or € 17 per inhabitant. 
However, the vertical block grant is considered in the local equalisation formula. The 
same  situation  can  be  observed  also  for  the  most  important  special  grant  from  the 
central  government  –  namely,  the  grant  for  the  school  activities  of  municipalities  – 
which is credited in the equalisation of the expenditure needs. Since the reforms of 1996 
and 2005, special grants from the central government have not been so important any 
more and block grant and inter-local equalisation transfer are now the main pillars of the 
whole equalisation system. The following table 8 explains the complete effect of the 
local equalisation with the six “sample-municipalities” from table 7:     
Table 8: Total effect of the local equalisation system on six Swedish municipalities in € in 2005 
(preliminary estimation) 
Stockholm  Göteburg  Bjurholm  Burlöv  Dorotea  Umeå 
Tax base 
equalisation 
 - € 203  + € 382  + € 1,091  + € 752  + € 998  + 693 € 
Cost base 
equalisation  





+ € 39  + € 0  + € 47   + € 6  + € 339  + € 0  
Vertical 
Block grant 
- € 24  - € 24  - € 24  - € 24  - € 24  - € 24 
Total  
per capita 
- € 50  + € 383  + € 1,850  + €  721  + € 2,410  + € 295
Receiving 




-  € 38,279,200  + € 183,230,242  + € 4,789,950  + € 1,199,574  + € 7,603,550   + € 32,237,305 
   Source: own calculation based on Statistka centralbyran 
All in all, 13 municipalities are the ”donor municipalities” in 2005, while 276 receive a 
transfer from the equalisation system. The same asymmetrical situation exists within the 16
equalisation of the counties, because the county of Stockholm is the only net payer and 
the other 20 counties are receiving funds from the equalisation system.   
The Swedish equalisation system has huge impact on the financial situation of the local 
authorithies and balances the municipalities closely to the national average tax base of     
€ 15,630  and the national average of expenditure of € 2,970. The following figure 
shows the 289 Swedish municipalities
24 after the local equalisation and the distribution 
of the vertical grants in the fiscal year of 2005: 
Figure 8 The Swedish municipalities after the local equalisation and the distribution of the vertical 





















Source: own calculation  
4.Conclusion   
The Nordic local public finance system is unique worldwide, because in no unitary or 
federal country is the proportion of the local expenditure to the total expenditure higher. 
This high amount of local expenditure level is financed mainly by local surcharges on 
the PIT and other local taxes as well as by a very detailed local equalisation system. The 
following  figure  9  shows  that  besides  the  three  described  countries  of  Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden also the Scandinavian country of Finland possesses a high level of 
local expenditure.  
Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that in figure 9 the federal countries, which are 
highlighted  by  the  pattern,  are  observed  without  their  respective  second  tier  of 
governments (states, provinces or cantons), while the unitary countries include all sub-
national levels of government.    17
Figure 9: Portion of the local expenditure of the total public expenditure in the fiscal year of 2000 













       
Source: own calculation  
Nevertheless, the Danish local public finance system could be benchmarked as a very 
all-embracing and coherent system. With the PIT and the various property taxes, the 
local  authorities  possess  two  major  tax  sources.  Besides,  the  almost  independent 
determination  of  the  local  surcharge  on  the  PIT,  the  actual  annual
25  market-based 
valuation  of  the  property  taxation  is  another  positive  element  of  the  Danish  public 
finance system.  Moreover, the Danish local equalisation system is not only based on 
tax  revenues  but  also  on  expenditure  needs,  and  the  capital  of  Copenhagen  and  its  
surrounding metropolitan areas have been "readjusted"
26.  
The Norwegian local public system is more centralized than the Danish and Swedish 
local public systems. Indeed, the Norwegian local authorities are also mainly financed 
by tax revenues, but since 1977 all municipalities in Norway have chosen the highest 
possible tax rate of the PIT, which is not a sign for financial independence. Another 
distinction of the Norwegian local public finance system in contrast to Denmark and 
Sweden is that in Norway no general equalisation of the different expenditure needs 
exists  and  the  tax  equalisation  is  not  based  on  the  tax  base  but  rather  on  the  tax 
revenues.  The  following  figure  10  summarizes  the  different  marginal  rates  of (tax-) 
compensation
27  in  Denmark  (red  continuous  line),  Norway  (black  dashed  line)  and 
Sweden (blue dotted line) in the tax equalisation: 18















































Relative financial position in percent
Source: own illustration  
Sweden  uses  the  highest  marginal  rates  of  compensation,  whereas  the  Danish  tax 
equalisation system compared to Norway and Sweden is more moderate. The degree of 
the marginal rates of compensation is always a fundamental political decision which 
could be a “hard row to hoe”, if we consider the long political reform discussion for 
example in Germany and Switzerland. The only solution to avoid this political “hot 
potatoes”  is  to  delegate  the  complete  equalisation  measurement  to  an  independent    
Council of Economic Experts like for example the Australian Commonwealth Grant 
Commission. But on the other hand, always leads such “political outsourcing” to a lack 
of democracy control and boosts the complexity of the system, because bureaucratic 
experts have to consider other principles than an elected representative.     
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